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Abbreviations	  	  	  
AU = African Union  
BRICS = Coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa  
EU  = European Union  
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council 
ICC = International Criminal Court 
ICISS  = International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty  
LAS = League of Arab States 
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
NTC  = National Transitional Council 
OIC = Organisation of Islamic Cooperation  
R2P  = Responsibility to Protect  
RPF  = Rwandan Patriotic Front  
UK = United Kingdome  
UN = United Nations 
UNSC  = United Nation Security Council  
US = United States 
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1.	  Introduction	  
 
1.1.	  Pretext	  	  
Millions of human beings remain in the mercy of civic war, insurgencies, state 
repression and state collapse. In a modern globalised world with massive media 
coverage ‘there is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring in a 
faraway country of which we know little’ (ICSSI 2001:5). When governments are either 
unable or unwilling to protect their citizens the global society have a responsibility to 
protect these citizens. This notion of a responsibility to protect has been implemented 
by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 2005 World Summit and provides 
guidelines for when humanitarian intervention is the best solution. Humanitarian 
intervention can be handled in different ways. This can be either a diplomatic, military 
or economic approach.  
The topic of military humanitarian intervention has always been debated in both the 
academic world and by supranational institutions. There are diverging opinions. Fore 
some the international community has never intervened enough. They believe that 
intervention is the only solution in dealing with other nation’s violations on human 
rights. For others interventions happen too often and to carelessly. Their critique is 
based on a concern about the legal aspects, the legitimacy and the execution of the 
intervention. They are concerned that the background for the intervention is not based 
on humanitarian grounds but rather emerges from state self-interest. This also leads to a 
violation on state sovereignty constituted by The Westphalian Peace in 1648. This 
universal norm of inviolable state sovereignty has during the last 20 years undergone a 
necessary recharacterisation from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility 
both internally and externally. In an interdependent world where the norm of 
sovereignty has changed, the weakness of fragile and failed states constitutes a risk to 
all other nations, which has led to the international norm of Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P).    
This dilemma has been expressed by Kofi Annan at the United Nations General 
Assembly in 1999, and in 2000:   
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“…if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (ICSSI 2001:VII) 
This has led to the idea that sovereign nation states have a responsibility to protect their 
citizens and if they are not able to do so the broader community of states must 
undertake this responsibility.  
Through time the United Nations has a history of humanitarian interventions when 
countries are not themself able to protect the citizens or are directly endangering the 
lives of people. “Human rights have now become a mainstream part of international 
law, and respect for human rights a central subject and responsibility of international 
relations (ICSSI 2001:6).” In spite of this the topic of humanitarian intervention remain 
controversial both when the global society choses to intervene and when they do not.  
Since the end of the Cold War there has been a number of both UN approved and non-
UN approved humanitarian interventions. These have been executed with different 
degrees of success. The 1992 intervention in Somalia is an example of an 
unsuccessfully planned and implemented intervention. Four years later in 1994 the 
consequences of the failure in Somalia resulted in the international society’s hesitance 
to use military force in intervening in Rwanda. These two cases and the interventions in 
Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo have confirmed the critics of both the pro-interventionist and 
anti-interventionist side of the humanitarian intervention debate and fuelled the current 
debate about the Libyan intervention and the unwillingness to intervene in Syria. Even 
if two cases experience the same degree of humanitarian crises, why does the 
international society chose to intervene in one of the cases and not in the other? Which 
additional interests underline these decisions?  
The recent military intervention in Libya has been heralded as the first real 
embracement of the Responsibility to Protect by the international community and a 
turning point for the doctrine. In March of 2011, Ramesh Thakur, a political science 
professor in Canada and a former "R2P commissioner" at the United Nations, suggested 
that "Resolution 1973 marks the first military implementation of the doctrine of 
responsibility to protect'”. He concluded that "R2P is coming closer to being solidified 
as an actionable norm". There is evidence to suggest that Thakur may be correct in 
some of his remarks, but imprecise in others (The Star 21-03-2011). 
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Despite the debate about whether to intervene in Libya or not, the core of both sides is 
how and when intervention should be exercised, and with whose authority it should be 
done. The kind of intervention this project is focused on is the military action taken 
against a stat or its leader, without its consent, for a purpose claimed to be humanitarian 
or protective, as it happened in Libya from February to November 2011.  
When an intervention is conducted there is some criterions, which have to be fulfilled in 
order to make it a legitimate intervention. This project seeks to clarify how the 
intervention gained legitimacy for use of military force, what the criterions for such an 
intervention are, and who has the legitimacy to authorize such a military intervention? 
Further it seeks to clarify in what way Responsibility to Protect has influenced the 
humanitarian intervention conducted in Libya. Has the intervention in Libya been 
affected by the norm of Responsibility to Protect, and has the intervention changed 
Responsibility to Protect, and if this is the case, how? 
Another point of interest is the possible ulterior motives states might have, when it is to 
be decided whether to intervene or not. Russia and China have a history of being against 
interventions and the use of force, and due to their positions as permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council the self-interest of states regarding interventions is 
a area that can not be ignored.  
Combined this leads to the research question, which in sort terms seeks to clarify how 
the norm of a universal Responsibility to Protect has influenced the 2011 intervention in 
Libya conducted by the United Nations. This leads us to the following research 
question: 
1.1.1.	  Research	  question	  	  
Which influence has the Responsibility to Protect had on the intervention in 
Libya?  
a. How did the intervention in Libya gain legitimacy? 
b. Can UN Resolution 1973 gain legitimacy from the Responsibility to Protect 
norm? 
c. How did state interests affect the intervention in Libya? 
d. Which influence has the intervention in Libya had on the norm of Responsibility 
to Protect? 
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1.2.	  Conceptual	  clarification	  	  	  
1.2.1.	  Humanitarian	  intervention	  
What is humanitarian Intervention? For the purpose of this rapport the definition of 
Holzgrefe and Keohane will be used. 
“ the treat or use of force across state borders by a state or a group of states aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread or grave violations of the fundamental human rights 
of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state whose 
territory force is applied” (Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003: 18). 
 
1.2.2.	  The	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  
The Responsibility to Protect, the 2001 report of the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), attempted to resolve the tension between 
the competing claims of sovereignty and human rights by building a new consensus 
around the principles that should govern the protection of endangered people. The 
principle of Responsibility to Protect was adopted by the UN General Assembly at the 
2005 World Summit. But what is the „Responsibility to Protect‟, how was it adopted, 
and what does it mean for the future of humanitarian intervention. 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was founded by 
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun under the authority of the Canadian Government 
and consisted of members from the United Nations General Assembly. The purpose of 
the Committee was to define an answer to the following question posed by Kofi Annan: 
“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica - to gross and systematic violations of 
human rights that affect every precept of our common humanity?” (ICSSI 2001:VII) 
The purpose of the committee was to build a broader understanding of the problem of 
reconciling intervention and sovereignty and to encourage global political consensus on 
how to move from debating the issue, towards action within the international system, 
particularly through the United Nations. The ICISS Research Directorate is located at 
the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at The Graduate Center of the City 
University of New York (CUNY) and provided essential support. This international 
research team was led by Thomas G. Weiss, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute and 
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Presidential Professor, Stanlake J.T.M. Samkange, a lawyer from Zimbabwe and former 
UN staff member, and Don Hubert, of the Peacebuilding and Human Security Division 
at Foreign Affairs Canada (ICISS Web) 
In the report “The Responsibility to Protect” from 2001 the commission argued that 
states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens. When they are unable or 
unwilling to do so, or when they deliberately terrorize their citizens, the “the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect‟ (ICISS 2001: 
11). The report broadens this responsibility to encompass not only the responsibility to 
react to humanitarian crises but also the responsibility to prevent such crises and the 
„responsibility to rebuild‟ failed and tyrannical states.  
The international community is obligated to support states to fulfil its responsibility by 
helping them to prevent conflicts and to rebuild war-torn societies after conflicts. 
Responsibility to Protect thus is about more than just military intervention, it actually 
rests on the three pillars: prevention, protection and rebuilding. Firstly, an essential 
function of an intervention force should be to provide basic security and protection for 
all members of the state in which intervention is transpiring. This also means that 
intervening military forces are obligated to prevent revenge killings and even "reverse 
ethnic cleansing" after the initial objectives of interventions are met. For intervention 
forces, the most logical measure to prevent ethnic cleansing would be to ensure that 
local security forces are disarmed and demobilized. However, a climate of fear may 
exist in post-conflict Libya, which would make it difficult for groups to relinquish their 
arms any time soon (ICISS 2001:14). 
The second obligation pertains to achieving justice and reconciliation between parties. 
In accordance with the Responsibility to Protect, "external support for reconciliation 
efforts should be conscious of the need to encourage this cooperation, and dynamically 
linked to joint development efforts between former adversaries" (ICISS 2001:14). In 
Libya, the issue of administering punishment for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed in the civil war will need to be addressed. This is achieved through 
trials at The International Criminal Court.  
The final peace building responsibility of military intervention should be to encourage 
economic growth and sustainable development. It is important that intervening parties 
end any coercive economic measures they may have applied to the country before or 
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during the intervention, and not prolong punitive sanctions (ICISS 2001:14). Since 
February, the United Nations, the United States and the European Union have all 
imposed sanctions on the Libyan government and select Libyan companies, which to 
date have reportedly resulted in the freezing of Libyan state assets estimated at $120 
billion. So if the Responsibility to Protect is followed correctly, these measures will be 
removed. However, the removal of these sanctions will not hide the fact that Libya's 
economic recovery will take years (CBSnews 22-08-2012). 
The debate was reframed from the question of whether states have a right of 
intervention towards the question of where responsibility rests for protecting 
endangered peoples formed the basis of an attempt to generate a new international 
political consensus supporting what the ICISS report calls “intervention for human 
protection purposes‟ (ICISS 2001:13).  Basically Responsibility to Protect intervention 
was envisaged in case of state failure, where the state is unable or unwilling to protect 
the civilian population. However, only conflicts resulting in the four mass atrocities 
specified could justify activating the Responsibility to Protect principle the four mass 
atrocities are genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. Two 
crucial motivating factors behind founding ICISS were the aspiration to avoid future 
situations like Kosovo, where the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was 
paralyzed  by division among the five permanent members of the UNSC, and future 
situations like Rwanda, where the world stood aside as genocide unfolded. Therefore 
the true significance of Responsibility to Protect is not in creating new rights or 
obligations to do “the right thing” rather, it is in making it harder to do the wrong thing 
or nothing at all (Pattison 2011:247-250). Although it looks like The United Nations has 
adopted the Responsibility to Protect norm, there is no shared assumption that 
Responsibility to Protect can influence state behaviour. 
 
1.3.	  Historic	  overview	  
Humanitarian interventions is not a new phenomenon but has been carried out by the 
United Nations and independent states for decades. Some interventions have been short 
while others go on for several years. Some of the peacekeeping interventions was 
initiated in the 1940’s and are still not finished to this day, other lasted only for a couple 
of years. Though the purpose of humanitarian interventions should be seen as an 
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attempt to create peace and help the civilians, history also shows that these interventions 
have not always been successfully carried out and a lot of civilians as well as soldiers 
have lost their lives.  
The following aims to outline a historic overview of some of the humanitarian 
interventions that the United Nations has undertaken. The overview will not be a 
complete account of all the interventions the United Nations has been part of, it will 
instead focus some of the newer cases starting with the 1992 intervention in Somalia.  
Somalia	  	  
In 1992 the US intervened in Somalia due to massive starvation as a result of the civil 
war that started in 1991. For decades there had been rivalry between different 
‘warlords’ and young boys were turned into soldiers. The rivalry combined with 
drought drove many civilians away from their homes, which resulted in famine and 
killed between 300.000 and 350.000 people during 1992 (Wheeler 2000:174). Around 
the world people could follow the horrifying events in Somalia and the United Nations 
decided to send in small Pakistani troops to represent the civilians. The former US 
President Georg Bush started to airlift emergency supplies to the refugee centres most in 
need. Due to the unmanageable amount of civilians in need the United Nations decided 
in December 1992 to send in a large peacekeeping force consisting of thousands of US 
soldiers. In October 1993 a lot of soldiers were killed and the troops were withdrawn 
(BBC 15-11-2005). The loss of US troops had massive consequences a year later when 
the Clinton Administration decided to do nothing in the Rwandan genocide, which cost 
the lives of more than one million Rwandan citizens between April and July 1994 
(Wheeler 2000:172).   
Rwanda	  	  
April 6th 1994 a plane in Rwanda was shut down. Inside the plane was among others 
the Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana. For decades there had – and still are – 
rivalry between the two groups of Tutsis and Hutus but the killing of President 
Habyarimana who was a Hutu made the rivalry escalate into a massive genocide on 
Tutsis. During 100 days it is estimated that 800.000 was killed. Some sources say that it 
was even more. The killings were organised and in the beginning executed by military 
officials, politicians and businessmen but soon it was all Hutus against all Tutsis, and 
Hutus were encouraged or forced to kill their Tutsi neighbours. United Nations forces 
tried to negotiate a ceasefire after the death of President Habyarimana but this was not 
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achieved. After the murder on 10 soldiers the United Nations withdrew (BBC 18-12-
2008). In Uganda Tutsi refugees formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and in July 
1994 they managed to take over Kigali (The capital of Rwanda) the Hutu government 
collapsed and a ceasefire was achieved. None of this was due to interventions from the 
outside world since they did not do anything. But the genocide in Rwanda has had a 
huge impact on humanitarian interventions later on and the responsibility among 
countries to protect other countries’ citizens when the government fails to do so 
themselves.  
Kosovo	  	  
The intervention in Kosovo was not led by the United Nations but by NATO. What is 
remarkable with this intervention is that it was conducted without a United Nations 
mandate, which basically means that the intervention and use of force was not 
legitimate (Kjeldsen 2007:4).  
Kosovo went from being a part of Serbia with great autonomy to being under control of 
the Serbian capital Belgrade. The Kosovo-Albanians did not find this very positive. For 
decades there had been on-and-off rivalries between Serbs and Kosovo-Albanians. 
During 1998 this resulted in conflicts between Serbian military and police forces and 
Kosovo-Albanians and about 1.500 died and more than 400.000 was forced away from 
their homes – all Kosovo-Albanians (NATO 15-07-1999). In September 1998 NATO 
gave the Serbian forces an ultimatum to stop the assaults on Kosovo-Albanians but this 
did not help. Therefore NATO decided to intervene. An airstrike against the former 
Yugoslavia – now Serbia – was launched and lasted 77 days until Belgrade succumbed. 
After a massive NATO effort the Serbian president agreed to withdraw the troops from 
Kosovo. The United Nations made a Kosovo Peace Implementation Force and the 
conflict was put on hold. But still up till today there is disagreements between the two 
rivalling parts (BBC 24-01-2012).   
Syria	  
During the Arab spring in 2011 a revolt in Syria against President Bashar Assad rose 
due to years of oppression. More than thousands of lives have been lost and it is 
estimated that more than 200.000 from the opposition are imprisoned. Civilians as well 
as rebels are being oppressed, imprisoned and killed but the international society refuses 
to do anything (Information: 12-09-2012). The case was brought up for discussion in 
the United Nations Security Council where China and Russia blocked for an 
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intervention in Syria when interposing veto (Politiken 04-02-2012). Some of the 
Western countries as France, Britain and the USA were in favour of an intervention but 
because of the vote of veto they instead formed an alliance originally called Syrian 
National Coalition for Opposition and Revolutionary Forces. This coalition is more 
commonly known as Friends of Syria and besides the abovementioned countries it also 
consists of The Arab League and the European Union. The aim is to help the opposition 
and at the same time act as the “legitimate representative of the Syrian people” (The 
Telegraph 14-12-2012). 
A very resent case of intervention is the one in Libya. This intervention will create the 
frame for this project and therefore the following will elaborate on this case.  
 
 
1.4.	  The	  Case	  of	  Libya	  	  
 
In 2011 political protests demanded an end to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s 41-
year reign. Libyan civilians found themselves the target of mass cruelties at the hands of 
government armed forces. This forced the international community, regional and sub-
regional bodies to protect the populations through a range of economic, political and 
later military measures. This chapter will provide a play-by-play overview of the 
situation in Libya from February to October 2011. 
The uprising began 15th of February and was inspired by the events in the neighbouring 
countries Tunisia and Egypt and sparked by the arrest of a Libyan human rights 
campaigner named Fathi Turbel (STAND 24-02-2011). The police reacted fiercely with 
tear gas, water cannons and rubber bullets. Hereafter inspired by the other protest 
movements of the Arab Spring, protests expanded to more Libyan cities, calling for an 
end to the Qaddafi government. On February 17th, a ‘day of rage’ was held. Large scale 
protests took place in Benghazi, Ajdabija, Derna, Zintan and Bayda (Aljazeera 17-02-
2011). 
The Libyan rebels, now in control of large parts of East Libya, organized themselves in 
the ‘National Transitional Council’ (NTC) of Libya on February 27th (Temehu 08-08-
2012). On the 9th of March, the NTC warned the international community that if 
Qaddafi’s troops were to reach Benghazi, they would cause a massacre of more than 
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half a million people. Benghazi was soon subject to shocking brutality as Qaddafi 
dispatched the national army to crush the rebels, as the government troops attacked with 
ground assaults and bombing raids. In the capital, anti-government protesters were held 
down by pro-Qaddafi troops. Rebels, pro-Qaddafi troops and civilians were wounded 
and killed (BBC 20-10-2011). As the international community condemned the attacks 
on civilians, an operation to evacuate hundreds of thousands of foreign nationals was 
launched. France recognized the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya and called 
for immediate action by the international community against the Qaddafi regime 
(Temehu 08-08-2012). The next day, France found support in the United Kingdom as 
Cameron also underlined the need for international action in response to Qaddafi. In the 
days that followed, more and more states, among which nine Arab-League states, 
emphasized the need for a no-fly zone over Libya (BBC 20-10-2011). 
On February 22 Qaddafi gave a rambling yet defiant televised speech, saying he would 
"fight until the last man". In his speech he used language reminiscent of the genocide in 
Rwanda and stated that he would rather die a martyr than step down. Furthermore he 
called on his supporters to attack the protesting “cockroaches” and “cleanse Libya 
house by house” until protestors surrendered (Speech translated 22-02-2011). Hereby 
Qaddafi expressed clear intent to continue committing massive human rights violations 
by announcing to Benghazi residents that his forces would show “no mercy” to rebels. 
This caused the European Union to imposed sanctions, an arms embargo and a travel 
ban on Qaddafi and members of his family, and frozen the assets held by Libya’s 
sovereign wealth fund and central bank (Alternet 01-09-2011). 
From the 7th to the 18th of March fighting among pro- Gaddafi troops and rebellions 
escaladed throughout the country. In western Libya, battles raged for days in Misrata 
and Zawiya, with the latter coming under control of government forces. A source in 
Zawiya said bullets had been flying in all directions and that women and children as 
young as five were among the dead. By 20 February, Human Rights Watch reported 
that the death toll was at least 233 over the course of four days and that government 
troops were targeting civilians. This was denied by the government troops (HRW 2012).  
Resolution	  1970	  
On 26 February The Security Council responded to concern from the Arab League, 
African Union, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and Human Rights Council, 
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and adopted Resolution 1970. The resolution imposed an arms embargo and travel ban 
on the Qaddafi family and key members of government and froze the assets of the 
Gaddafi family (UN Resolution 1970). 
Resolution	  1973	  and	  no-­‐flight	  zone	  
When the non-military measures authorized in Resolution 1970 failed to deter Qaddafi 
from expressing clear intent to attack the population in Benghazi and halt the mass 
violence on protesters, the Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17 (UN 
Resolution 1973). China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany did not vote. Resolution 
1973 demanded an immediate “cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all 
attacks against, and abuses of, civilians”, it imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and 
increased the strength of the arms-embargo over Libya. Most importantly, the resolution 
also authorized member-states to take 
“…all necessary measures (…) to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a 
foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (UN Resolution 
1973). 
A Coalition of States, which ultimately included 15 NATO countries, Sweden, Jordan, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, took part in implementing the no-fly zone over 
Libya. After the initial instalment of the no-fly zone over Libya, NATO took over all 
military operations by March 29th, under the umbrella of ‘Operation Unified Protector’. 
On 29 March leaders from 35 governments and NGOs met in London to discuss the 
situation in Libya. They agreed that Qaddafi’s government had lost legitimacy and 
needed to be held accountable for its brutal use of force, established a political contact 
group to provide “leadership and overall political direction to the international effort in 
close coordination with the United Nations, African Union (AU), Arab League, 
Organization of  Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and EU to support Libya.” (BBC 20-10-
2011). 
The Coalition successfully provided support to rebel forces in Benghazi and Misrata 
and then later in Libya’s capital Tripoli, Gaddafi’s hometown Sirte, and other loyalist 
strongholds in Libya. The strikes also appeared to have stopped the advance of 
Qaddafi’s forces on Benghazi. But Qaddafi remained defiant. "We promise you a long, 
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drawn-out war with no limits," he said in a phone call to Libyan state TV. "We will fight 
inch by inch” (BBC 20-10-2011). 
As a response to this, NATO repeatedly bombarded Tripoli and other targets. Missiles 
hit Qaddafi's compound, with one attack killing one of his sons and three grandchildren. 
These attacks also resulted in the Libyan government accusing NATO of killing 85 
civilians in an air strike near Zlitan, west of Misrata. NATO insisted it hit a military 
staging base (BBC 20-10-2011). 
In August The International Criminal Court sought the arrest of the Libyan leader, his 
son and intelligence chief for crimes against humanity and the rebels' National 
Transitional Council was recognized as the country's interim government. The Council 
attempted to negotiate a peaceful resolution to stand-offs in the remaining places 
controlled by loyalists but failed (The Telegraph 19-11-2011).  
Crimes against humanity committed by pro-Qaddafi forces continued until 24th October 
when the rebels' National Transitional Council officials declared the end of the eight-
month conflict in Libya following the death of Qaddafi and his son Mutassim on 20th 
October. The NATO mission ended on 31th October as the UN Security Council voted 
unanimously on 26th October to end the no-fly zone in Libya (BBC 20-10-2011). 
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2.	  Methodology	  	  
The purpose of this project is to investigate the backgrounds of humanitarian 
interventions prosecuted by The United Nations. More specifically it seeks to examine 
what influence the Responsibility To Protect have had on the intervention in Libya. It 
aims to outline who has the legitimacy to intervene and some of the criteria for 
intervention. Throughout the project theories of neo-realism presented by Kenneth N. 
Waltz and constructivism presented by Alexander Wendt will be use to analyse the 
actions and motives behind R2P and the intervention in Libya. In next section of this 
chapter the epistemology of the two theories will be discussed. This will be done 
through an analysis divided into two parts, each with a slightly different purpose.  
 
Theories	  
As already mentioned above the two main theories is neo-realism and constructivism. 
The two theories’ notions about what an international society is, combined with Just 
War theory by Nicholas Wheeler, will be gathered into one definition of how 
international society is understood in this project. Just war theory recognizes that war 
can be fought on legitimate reasons. This is further elaborated through the use of 
Wheeler who lines up six requirements that has to be fulfilled before an intervention can 
take place. Combined this will create the theoretic framework of the project and will be 
actively used through out the analysis and discussion.  
  
 
Epistemology	  of	  the	  theories	  	  
One central purpose in this project is to view the intervention in Libya from different 
theoretical standpoints and thereby create a discussion. Neo-realism and constructivism 
are the main theories and differ in the way they conceive knowledge. Neo-realism 
presented by Kenneth Waltz wanted to make theories of international relations more 
scientific.  When looking at the epistemology it can be characterised as quite 
positivistic, bringing an aspect of natural science and believing that things can be 
measured and tested. Neo-realism does not take thoughts and ideas into account but is 
only concerned with structures. As it will be stated in the chapter regarding the used 
theories, neo-realism is concerned with structures of the international society and states. 
Individuals are in this regard not important (Jackson & Sørensen 2010: 73, 278-284).  
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Neo-realism is a material theory with focus on the distribution of material power 
whereas constructivists put more emphasis on the social structures. Constructivism is 
more normative, which means that it takes thoughts and ideas into account. Whereas 
neo-realism states that the scientist as much as possible should keep his own 
perceptions outside of the research, the normative theorists acknowledges that the 
perceptions of the scientist will be part of the research (Jackson & Sørensen 2010: 160).  
As it will be argued in later, the constructivist Alexander Wendt pays a lot of attention 
to interests and identities, which according to him are essential when analysing state 
behaviour and interaction.   
Nicholas Wheeler will through the project be used quite a lot. Wheeler is usually placed 
within the English School, which is also a normative theory. As constructivism the 
English School pays attention to identity and therefor we do not see it as a problem to 
use the theories of Wheeler.   
Just War theory was originally presented by Hugo Grotius who argues that war can be 
fought legitimately which to some extend is the same as Waltz and neo-realism who 
argues that “the state of nature is a state of war” (Waltz 1979: 102).  
To sum up the project is occupied whit to directions within international relation theory; 
neo-realism representing the positivistic side and constructivism on the other being 
more normative.   
Analysis	  	  
The analysis will be divided into five main parts each with a different approach to 
answering the research question: ”Which influence has the Responsibility to Protect had 
on the intervention in Libya?”. The analysis will be both analysing and discussing using 
the different theories presented in chapter 3 against each other. Beside the theories 
different articles and reports will be used to illustrate different opinions regarding the 
intervention in Libya.  
Politic	  legitimacy	  	  
The focus of the first passage in the analysis will be on the political legitimacy 
regarding the Libyan intervention. The analysis seeks to answer two questions, one 
regarding whether the coalition had legal rights to intervene in Libya and the second 
regarding the coalition forces and whether they were legally permitted to target loyalists 
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forces. Attention will be paid on the regional whish for intervention and the 
international whish to intervene.  
R2P	  and	  the	  just	  war	  criteria	  	  
The second passage of the analysis is closely linked to the previous. The aim of this 
passage is to use the parts from the analysis regarding politic legitimacy and analyse 
whether the intervention meat the criterions posed by the R2P. Selected aspects of the 
R2P protocol and Just War theory will be included and used as measurements on the 
intervention.  
Resolution	  1970,	  1973	  and	  No-­‐Fly	  Zones	  
To get a better understanding of the implications involved in the resolutions in Libya 
the third part of the analysis will be concerned with this issue. Here the focus will be on 
the two important resolutions, resolution 1970 and resolution 1973 and the impact they 
had on the intervention in Libya and whether or not they fulfil the R2P conditions. The 
analysis will consist of three parts; one concerned with Resolution 1970; one about 
Resolution 1973; and the last one will be concerned with the no-fly zone imposed on 
Libya. 
China,	  Russia	  and	  state	  interests	  
This passage will be divided into two miner parts. The first part will focus on the 
influence state-interests might have had on the decision to intervene in Libya. The two 
countries of focus will be China and Russia and the way they behaved before and during 
the crisis in Libya. The analysis will shed light on some of the interests both countries 
have in Libya and how this might have influenced their decisions in the United Nations 
Security Council. The focus of second part will still be on China and Russia and their 
interests regarding Libya but Responsibility to protect will here be the centre of 
attention. The way the two countries conceive R2P is important when trying to 
understand the division that are appearing within the UNSC.  
Through this passage of the analysis neo-realism and constructivism will be used to 
draw some parallels between the theories and the actions of states. Further Nicholas 
Wheeler’s six criteria for intervention will be used to analyse if the according to his 
theory was basis for an intervention.  
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R2P	  after	  Libya	  	  
The last passage of the analysis has its focus on R2P after Libya. The question asked 
here it whether the intervention in Libya has changed the norm of R2P and whether the 
involved states have changed their opinion about it. The passage will be linked to the 
previous since it to a high decree is China and Russia who are in opposition to R2P. 
Also here neo-realism and constructivism will be used because of their different views 
on reasons for being involved in international organisations.  
 
Material	  choices	  	  
This project is not based on empirical collected material but instead on theories and 
second-hand sources presented and gathered by others. When using second-hand 
material it is important to bare in mind the epistemological position of the theories and 
theorists. Beside the positions of the theories and theorists the rest of the used material 
also have to be taken into consideration. When using the rapport regarding the R2P 
written by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
we need to consider by who it is written, with what purpose and under which 
circumstances.  This has been done in section 1.2.2.  
Through the analysis the project will not only draw on the theories but also on different 
articles. These will be used to show different opinions regarding the intervention in 
Libya and the R2P notion. When using articles we need to take into consideration by 
whom they are written i.e. if the paper clearly is politically collard. The articles used in 
this project stems from many different sources but they are still carefully chosen. In the 
analysis passage regarding China and Russia’s interests we have chosen to use one 
article from a Russian paper (Pravda), one from the Chinese Post and some American 
and British as well. Also some scientific articles will be included e.g. one from e-
International Relations which is a collection of different articles regarding the 
intervention in Libya and it is written by several lectors on different British 
Universities.  
 
Demarcation	  	  	  	  
As mentioned above this project is mainly a theoretic project, which in this context 
means that it do not consist of empirical material that we ourselves have gathered. The 
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choice not to use empirical material as well as the choice of the used theories and other 
material brings about some limitations.  
The theories creates a frame within which the analysis and discussion takes place. Each 
of the theories has its specific set of terms and ways they conceive states and state 
interaction, which puts up some demarcations hence the analysis and discussion has to 
use these terms. To make sure that the analysis and discussion will be as thorough and 
precise as possible we have chosen two theories that are quite distinctive from each 
other. If only one theory had been used through the project the limitations would have 
been greater.  
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3.	  Theory	  
 
3.1.	  Theoretical	  Introduction	  	  
State sovereignty has long been a fundamental principle of international law. At least 
since the Peace of Westphalia, states have recognized the principle of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other states as an essential element of international relations. 
But after the Second World War, the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime upon its 
own citizens shocked the conscience of the world, and the once inviolable concept of 
sovereignty began to erode. The idea that international law should protect the rights of 
individuals, and not solely the rights of nations, began to gain wide acceptance, and 
international human rights treaties proliferated. These treaties guaranteed individuals a 
wide variety of rights, including life, liberty, and freedom of speech (Magnuson 2010: 
255). 
The violence that erupted in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia made it clear that, while 
there in the international society was a clear sense moral duty to intervene and to 
prevent the massacre of minority populations in these countries, the international legal 
framework made such an intervention illegal (Carpenter 2011). Although the United 
States did intervene in Kosovo, many commentators believed that this was an illegal 
intervention (Carpenter 2011). These debates created pressure on the world’s powers to 
work towards a new legal norm, a norm that would allow humanitarian intervention in 
certain limited circumstances. The R2P doctrine held that individual states have a 
responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, ethnic cleansing, or other large-
scale loss of life, and if a country is unable or unwilling to do so, that responsibility falls 
upon the international community as a whole. As a last alternative, military intervention 
is permitted (ICISS 2001: 1-5). 
	  
3.2.	  Realism	  vs.	  Constructivism	  
To understand the backgrounds of humanitarian interventions we first need to know 
more about state interaction and sovereignty. Here we have chosen to use realism and 
constructivism against each other and in the end these two will form our theoretic 
standpoint supplemented by International Society theory and Just War theory.  The 
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following section will be going through the main points of neo-realism presented by 
Kennth Waltz and constructivism presented by Alexander Wendt.  
Realism is one of the eldest international relation theories and many of the later has 
come as a reaction to realism. Neo-realism has its focus on the structures of the system 
and balance of power. Human beings do not play any role hence it is the structures that 
determine power-balances and actions. Waltz characterise the international system, as 
one on of anarchy where every state must think of its self-interests since no one else can 
be counted on doing so (Donnelly 2009:36). This can in some cases lead to arms races 
and other costly behaviour due to the fact the states cannot trust each other. This is also 
what is called the prisoners dilemma, which in short terms characterise the dilemma of 
what to do. A state i.e. a prisoner can either chose to cooperate or not. In prisoners 
dilemma it is best for both parts to cooperate and confess but as they do not know what 
the other will do chances are that they remain silent. The same can be applied on state 
interactions. In fear of not knowing what the other state will do this might lead to arms 
race – as just mentioned above – and anarchy can be said to defeat the best intentions 
(Donnelly 2009:38-40).    
In Waltz definition of neo-realism structures is essential. If the conception of structures 
is to be useful we have to abstract from questions about “the kinds of political leaders, 
social and economic institutions and ideological commitments states may have” (Waltz 
1979:80). Political, economic, cultural and military interactions of states are also things 
that we have to abstract from. When defining structures we have to leave aside how 
states relate to each other and instead focus on how they stand in relation to each other. 
Structures are the arrangement of separate parts of a system, i.e. the arrangement of 
states in the international system, which also makes structures an organizational 
concept. This means that structures only exist because of the coexistence of other states 
(Waltz 1979:80-93).  
The national or domestic system is characterised as one where the citizens do not have 
to defend themselves – it is the job of the government, which also means that the system 
isn’t a self-help system. The national system is hierarchic, which implies that different 
units depend on and benefit from each other. The international system on the contrary is 
a self-help system. Every state has to look after it self. Between states there is an 
anarchic order. The systems are functionally similar, which makes them independent. It 
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is important to note that though states are functionally similar they do differ in 
capabilities. Great powers must constantly balance their power in order to reduce the 
risk of another country turning on them. Balance is among other things upheld through 
a build up of military power and by engaging in alliances (Waltz 1979: 102-104).    
Another important factor in the actions of a state is the concept of relative gains. 
Liberals are concerned with absolute gains, which mean that they believe that the state 
will always gain something but the gain is not really important. According to neo-realist 
on the other hand it is not only the gain of one state that is important but it is to a higher 
extend important what one state gain compared to another. This also means that even if 
one state experience massive loss it is not bad as long as another state experience a 
greater loss. In other words; the gain is always relative to the other state’s (Donnelly 
2009:39).   
Whereas the neo-realistic approach has it focus on structures and self-interest of the 
state, constructivists are also concerned with the security of individuals beyond the 
state-borders. When regarding interventions neo-realists would argue that a country 
only intervenes if it fits its self-interests. The ideas posed by the R2P do not have huge 
impact on the decision to use military force.  Constructivists on the other hand would 
find that ideas matter and hence the R2P can influence the international society’s 
decision to intervene or not (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:160-168).  
Constructivists argue that interaction between states can lead to benign and friendly 
culture. The neo-realistic approach does not take humans into consideration, which is a 
big difference between neo-realism and constructivism. According to constructivists, 
human and international relations consists of thoughts and ideas and not material forces 
or conditions. In other words; the individual is more determinative than the material in 
international relations (Jackson & Sørensen 2010:160-168).    
Also in constructivism structures play an important role. Systems of shared believes, 
values and ideas have structural characteristics and these are essential in social as well 
as political actions. Structures shape the identities of political actions, which mean that, 
“the norms of the international system condition the social identity of the sovereign 
state.”(Reus-Smit 2009:220). The structures are not only of material character. The 
non-material structures are also of importance hence these structures condition the 
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identities of the actors. This is because identities create interests and actions (Reus-Smit 
2009:210-220).  
According to Alexander Wendt states have a common history and they are constituted 
as unitary actors. The state is understood as structures of political authority formed by 
norms, rules and principles. Furthermore the state-structures are institutionalised in law 
and official regulations (Wendt 1995:202-203).   
To understand how and why certain international political events happen we need to 
understand how the actors develop their interests. Constructivists argue that identities 
are “the basis of interests” (Reus-Smit 2009:221).  This means that the actions of a 
state reflects its interests and hence its identity. These interests can be self-interests but 
it might as well be interests regarding other countries too (Reus-Smit 2009:221).  
The identities and interests of actors are conditioned by normative and ideational 
structures but these only exist due to the knowledgeable practice of the actors. Non-
material structures do as just mentioned impact on identities and interests but practices 
helps maintaining and transforming the structures. It is, according to Wendt, through 
reciprocal interaction that social structures are created and it is these that define the 
identities and interests of actors. This means that actors and structures are mutually 
constituted. Reus-Smit says in this contexts that international norms uphold liberal 
democracy as the dominant model of legitimate statehood and at the same time the it 
only exists because of continued practices of liberal democratic states (Reus-Smit 
2009:221-222).   
 
There are some clear differences between neo-realism and constructivism, which also 
will be reflected in the analysis where they more thoroughly will be used as arguments 
to why states and the international society act the way they do with regards to the 
intervention in Libya. The main differences are to be found in their conception of states’ 
role in the international society. Neo-realism argues that states first of all act on behalf 
of self-interests and that use of force also is to be used in this regard. If countries engage 
in an intervention there will be traces of self-interests; it is not purely to help others, 
which is explained by the focus on relative gains. Constructivism on the other hand 
finds that involvement and interactions between states will have positive outcomes in 
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the shape of benign cultures among the states. The emphasis on interests, ideas and 
identity has influenced the conception of interventions and the R2P and hence 
constructivist would argue that a concept like the R2P would impact on the decisions of 
a government.   
A strong argument against the intervention in Libya was that the international 
community could not legitimately go after Gaddafi if it would not also go after every 
other dictator. However, it is important to recall that the R2P doctrine actually promotes 
military force for civilian protection not in every case where it might be merited, but 
rather only in limited circumstances roughly resembling just war theory (Carpenter 
2011).  
 
	  3.3.	  Just	  War	  Theory	  
This paragraph is based on Jus Ad Bellum which recognizes that sometimes war is 
fought for legitimate reasons. The Justice of war principles originated with the ideas of 
Hugo Grotius theories of natural law, whereas the minimum criteria for going to war 
have been set up by the contemporary constructivist Nicholas Wheeler, whose ideas will 
be further elaborated upon in the next section. 
Hugo Grotius was a late 16th and early 17th century natural rights theorists and 
perceived as the father of international law. He defined natural law as a perceptive 
judgment in which things are good or bad by their own nature. Grotius Just war theory 
divides into three parts to determine whether a war is conducted justly: 
1. Jus ad bellum – the justice of resorting to war. 
2. Jus in bello – just conduct in war. 
3. Jus post bellum – justice at the end of war. (Christopher 1999: 83) 
 
The modern legal principle of Jus ad Bellum arises from the notion that international 
agreements limit the reasons for just war.  In the late twentieth century a number of 
multilateral treaties defining entirely new restrictions against going to war appeared. 
The three most notable examples are the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an 
instrument of national policy, the London Charter defining crimes against peace as one 
of three major categories of international crime, and the United Nations Charter, which 
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declares in Article 2: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations” 
(Christopher 1999: 82) (UN Charter: Article 2) 
Some of the reflections made by Grotius are echoed in Nicholas Wheelers book Saving 
Strangers and in the ICISS report R2P. Especially, Grotius Jus Ad Bellum six 
conditions of just war. Wheeler has modernized these principles based upon Just War 
theory and jus ad bellum. Wheeler defines six minimum requirements, which has to be 
met before intervening. 
1. There has to be a just cause for military intervention for human protection 
purposes. To be warranted, there must be a large scale loss of life, regardless of 
whether there is genocidal intent or not, or a large scale ethnic cleansing. The 
question remains open about who defines what is just and what is large scale. 
 
2. There also must be a right intention, which means that the primary purpose of 
the intervention must be to halt or avert human suffering, regardless of whatever 
other motives intervening states may have (e.g., to prevent huge refugee flows, 
material gain, geopolitical interests). 
 
3. Military intervention must be the last resort and can only be justified when every 
non-military option has been explored. This criterion would be consistent with 
the UN Charter, according to which the non-military measures provided for in 
UN Charter Article 41. 
 
4. Concerning the scale, duration, and intensity of the planned military 
intervention, the means must be proportional, using only the minimum necessary 
force. 
 
5. There must be reasonable prospects of success in halting or averting the 
suffering. At a certain point doubts may arise about whether the number of lives 
lost is not higher than those saved. In summer 2011, the air campaign in Libya 
seems to have reached a tipping point. Like the similar uncertainties during the 
air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.  
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6. The need for right authority, which in R2P requires multilateral consent.  Right 
authority also decides what is a conscience-shocking situation, what is just, what 
is right, what is proportional, when is the last resort and what is a reasonable 
prospect (Wheeler 2000:34). 
 
If a case is not clearly meeting these conditions, the R2P doctrine urges merely non-
military protection measures, which could be humanitarian assistance and diplomacy. 
The R2P is open to the possibility that action does not have to be entirely dependent on 
Security Council authorization. If the Security Council fails to act upon its 
responsibility to protect in “conscience-shocking situations”, concerned states can act 
without this authorization (Christopher 1999: 91). 
The R2P criteria might intend to make it more difficult for states to make self-interested 
interventions look like humanitarian ones, but they also could be seen as opening the 
door to a general pattern of intervention. If there is no internationally recognized 
competent authority, any state could maintain the right to intervene for itself. Therefore 
the R2P criteria cannot stand alone without defining the right authority (Christopher 
1999: 92). 
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4.	  Analysis	  	  
4.1.	  	  How	  Has	  R2P	  Affected	  the	  Intervention	  in	  Libya?	  
The analysis seeks to provide an answer to the research question, which is: “Which 
influence has the Responsibility to Protect had on the intervention in Libya?” As 
mentioned in chapter two regarding the method of the project, each part of the analysis 
provides an answer to one of the sub questions listed in the introduction.    
	  
4.1.1.	  Political	  legitimacy	  and	  legal	  authority	  	  
This part of the analysis seeks to shed light on the political legitimacy and authority 
needed to execute interventions by answering sub-question one, asking: “How did the 
intervention in Libya gain legitimacy?” It is important to remember that even though 
Responsibility to Protect is a useful principle for guiding international conventions, it is 
only a norm and not a law. In the case of Libya, there are two main issues to consider 
the legality of the intervention. The first legal question is whether the coalition had the 
legal right to intervene in Libya to begin with. The second is concerned with whether 
coalition forces were legally permitted to target loyalist forces, including Qaddafi 
himself.  
What made the Libyan case so remarkable was not just the threat to a large civilian 
population, but the extent to which political and legal legitimacy for the intervention 
was sought before the intervention began.  
Lessons from Iraq made both the NATO chief and the Obama Administration set basic 
conditions, which had to be met before intervening. NATOs preconditions were; 
demonstrable need, clear legal basis and firm regional support. Similarly, the Obama 
Administration required; a local requests for intervention, regional legitimacy, legal 
legitimacy and a truly multilateral coalition that shared the burden of costs (E-
international Relations 25-01-2012). Both NATO and the Obama administration has 
publically stated that these condition were all met before the Libya intervention. By 
delineating how the coalition’s military actions were fulfilled, this section seeks to 
examine its quest for political legitimacy and legal authority. 
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Local	  Requests	  for	  Intervention	  
In order to provide basic political legitimacy, intervention would ideally have been 
requested from the Libyan population as a whole. While the NTC was not a 
representative body chosen through democratic elections, it is the de-facto interim-
government of Libya and currently enjoys international recognition as their sole 
legitimate representative (BBC 05-07-2011). However this was not the case when 
legitimacy first needed to be established. At the time of intervention, the only country 
that had officially recognized the NTC was France, and the United Nation’s recognition 
of the NTC did not come until September 16th (Aljezeera 17-09-2012). So even though 
the TNC was not officially recognized it can be argued that their cause and interests 
were reflected in the rest of the Libyan population. As University of Michigan professor 
Juan Cole points out, when one takes into account the populations of cities like Tobruk, 
Derna, Bayda, Benghazi, Zawiya, Zuara, and districts of Tripoli anywhere from 80-90% 
of the Libyan population is represented as anti-Qaddafi (Security Council 17-03-2011). 
Clearly not all of the cities’ residents were participating in the February 17th movement, 
but it was from these cities that the vast majority of Libyans demanded a No-Fly Zone 
(Security Council 17-03-2011).  
Regional	  Support	  
An important element of the intervention in Libya was the need for regional support. 
One of the biggest political obstacles for international action was a request from the 
Arab world. Without the Arab world’s explicit request for intervention, the intervention 
risked being interpreted as neo-colonial imperialism. Fortunately regional consensus 
transpired within weeks, thank to Qaddafi’s aggression towards his neighbours (The 
Telegraph 12-03-2011). 
By February 25th 200 Arab NGOs coordinated their efforts by calling for the protection 
of civilians in Libya through a UN-sponsored and Arab League-led No-Fly Zone. The 
groups spanned 18 countries and included a public statement signed by 35 prominent 
Arab intellectuals (National Review 22-02-2012). 
“The Libyan people are living through a defining moment in their history. Their 
demands for basic human rights and an end to 42 years of cruel oppression are 
legitimate. We shall not stand silent and watch them pay the price of this demand with 
their blood.  Without urgent action from the UN Security Council supported by the EU, 
African Union and Arab League, the window of opportunity to protect civilians from the 
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threat of further atrocities will close. We believe it is the personal and moral 
responsibility of each and every one of you to ensure immediate action is taken to stop 
the bloodshed in line with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (Ahram: 27-02-2011).” 
Among the measures suggested by the Arab world were sanctions, asset freezes, and an 
arms embargo, the UN implemented all of these only two days later.  
In a poll in April consisting of 1,000 people across 16 Arab states, only 10% of 
respondents still thought that Qaddafi’s regime was legitimate – compared to 41% 
backing up the NTC. The same poll found that 75% supported the forcible removal of 
Qaddafi from power, although most would have liked to see Arab governments take the 
lead in the operation. The poll also revealed that the majority of Arabs showed greater 
support than opposition for NATO’s no-flight zones over Libya, many stating that: 
“Arab states can’t react in a timely and effective manner; and Arab states are unable to 
play any role due to the wave of revolutions” (The Doha Debate: 18-05-2011). On this 
basis it seems evident that there were a strong regional support for the intervention and 
the no-flight zones in the Arab community. However regional support for an 
intervention is not enough there has to be a clear legal foundation. 
Clear	  legitimacy	  	  
Chapter 7 of the UN Charter provides a framework within which the Security Council 
may take enforcement action. The Security Council can “determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (UN Charter: Chapter 7) 
and take military and nonmilitary action to “restore international peace and security”. It 
was under this UN statute that France, the United Kingdom, and Lebanon proposed the 
adoption of the United Nations Security Council 1973. The vote on UNSC Resolution 
1973 provided the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan Revolution by first 
demanding an immediate ceasefire, and then authorizing the international community to 
enforce a No-Fly Zone, approving “all necessary measures to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas (UN Resolution 1973) (UN News: 17-05-2011)” 
Before action could be taken the intervention had to meet the requirements of the R2P 
framework. Whether or not this is the case will be discussed below. 
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4.1.2.	  The	  Libya	  Intervention	  and	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  criteria	  	  
Where as the previous part of the analysis found political and legal measures for 
interventions to be conducted this part will have its focus on the criterions posed by the 
R2P and Just War theory. Parts of the R2P protocol will be used together with concrete 
examples from the Libyan intervention and together with the previous section this will 
answer how the Libyan intervention gained legitimacy.  
Before the states of the Coalition of the Willing decided to use force to protect Libyan 
civilians against armed attacks by the Libyan regime, they had to take into consideration 
the six conditions of Just War theory and the requirements of the R2P framework.  
In order for an intervention to be legitimate, the R2P doctrine sets a number of 
principles for humanitarian intervention, the most important of which, will be discuss 
below. First there must be a just cause and there should be “large scale loss of life, 
actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of 
deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation” 
(ICISS 2001:7). It is easily argued that this was certainly the case in Libya, mainly due 
to the intentions ousted by Gaddafi’s speech of March, 16th.  
Second there must be a right intention, the primary intention of the intervening states 
should be ‘to halt or avert human suffering’. In order to safeguard the pure intentions of 
the intervening forces, interventions should preferably be multilateral. Although it is 
reasonably to state that the Libyan intervention averted human suffering in the short 
term, it is another issue all together to state with certainty the long-term effects of the 
intervention, and the primary motives of the intervening forces (Europe’s World 02-07-
2011). 
For the U.S. State Department, humanitarian reasons were the decisive factor, not 
potential military hazards, and it overruled the Pentagon, which had doubts about the 
military feasibility. It could be argued that the political goal of the Libya intervention 
was in fact a regime change rather than a humanitarian concern, thereby putting the 
international society’s interests in democratizing Libya, before human rights. In itself 
regime change does not meet the R2P criteria of the right intention unless the just cause 
cannot be achieved otherwise. The purpose of the use of force could be other than 
humanitarian. Another objective has been to demonstrate solidarity within the NATO 
alliance, certainly not a R2P criterion, but it put pressure on alliance members to join 
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the coalition. Germany has been criticized heavily for lacking alliance solidarity 
because it abstained from the Security Council vote, although its concerns about the 
military success of the campaign might have been legitimate (Europe’s World 02-07-
2011). 
The use of military intervention in Libya can be described as a last resort. Before 
military force a number of “soft powers” were used and diplomatic approaches have 
been explored. The European Union imposed sanctions such as arms embargo and a 
travel ban on Gaddafi and members of his family, and frozen the assets held by Libya’s 
sovereign wealth fund and central bank. Yet peaceful means were not exhausted before 
the military invasion began. A high level international team – consisting of 
representatives from the Arab League, the African Union, and the United Nations 
Secretary General – should have been dispatched to Tripoli to attempt to negotiate a real 
cease-fire, and set up a mechanism for elections and for protecting civilians. 
The fourth principles set forth by R2P is that the intervention ought to be proportional. 
This is of cause a question of assessment, but we will argue that since the operation 
consisted mainly of the imposition of a no-fly zone, it can be argued that the coalition 
used proportional force. In the past, no-fly-zones and air campaigns have proven 
insufficient such as in the case of Iraq, Srebrenica and in Kosovo where ethnic cleansing 
actually increased during the NATO air campaign. (Europe’s World: 02-07-2011).  
Also, it is undisputed that the consequences of non-action would have been worse than 
those of action. Finally, the Right Authority criterion is also met, since R2P prescribes 
that “There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security 
Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes.” (ICISS 
2001: 7). The R2P report states that “right intention is better assured with multilateral 
operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.” In 
contrast to the Iraq war, the Libyan operation is clearly multilateral. It was accepted by 
the Security Council and was implemented by a coalition of NATO states. In addition, 
the resolution has been endorsed by the Arab League and thereby obtains a legitimacy 
of regional opinion.  
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In sum, one could argue that the Libyan case could be seen as an R2P case, although 
Resolution 1973 also refers to the UN Charter in that the situation in Libya constitutes 
“a threat to international peace and security” (UN Resolution 1973). There are 
tensions between some of the R2P criteria. The political goal of regime change and the 
limited mandate of the Security Council to protect civilians are not necessarily 
congruent. Also, the possibility of implementing humanitarian goals by military means 
remains questionable. As a result, UNSC Resolution 1973 is seen as the first resolution 
to put this new norm into practice. The adoption of such a resolution is unprecedented 
in the history of the Security Council, it marks the first time that “the UN ordered 
international military action against a member state to prevent an expected massacre of 
civilians within its borders, rather than after civilian deaths had occurred” (Europe’s 
World 02-07-2011). 
There are a number of critics who argue against the Libyan intervention as an example 
of the R2P put into practice. One of them is James Pattison, senior Lecturer in Politics 
at the University of Manchester. Pattison argues that although the situation in Libya was 
so grave that a humanitarian intervention on the grounds of R2P was justified, but the 
force applied by the international society in order to force a regime change, by an 
external party in support of a rebel movement, was not (Pattison: 2011).  
This lead to the question whether the intention of the Libya intervention is 
predominantly a humanitarian one in sum to protect civilians or is the real intention the 
removal of Qaddafi and to promote democracy in the region. If this is in fact the case, 
and a regime change was the primary intention of the intervention, one could argue that 
the intervening forces used the R2P doctrine to obtain international legitimacy, even 
though the primary goal of the intervention was not humanitarian (World Policy 24-05-
2011).  
A second critique against the Libyan intervention as a case of the R2P doctrine is raised 
by Dana Allin and Erik Jones in their article “As Good as it Gets?” The critique is based 
on the inconsistency of the situations in which the international community decides to 
act. The Libyan intervention can be seen as illegitimate because the United States, 
France and Britain are not also intervening in states such as Bahrain, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, where authoritarian regimes and violations 
of human rights are also clearly present. The international community’s decision not to 
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intervene in these cases, even though the human rights violations are just as grave as 
those of Libya, can be interpreted as evidence that the R2P is not the primary motive for 
the international community to intervene. Following this argument other motives could 
be the decisive factor in an intervention, questioning the R2P as the leading principle on 
which humanitarian intervention is based (Allin & Jones:2011) 
A counterargument is, that the urgent problem in Libya was not to create a democracy, 
which is not practical at gunpoint, but to prevent a massacre. Also the limited resources 
of the international community, especially in the case of military force and personnel 
there are limits. Although more interventions might be legitimized, states will always 
have to make a choice considering where to intervene and where not to, this does not 
affect the legitimacy of an intervention (World Policy: 24-05-2011). 
 
4.1.3.	  Resolution	  1970,	  1973	  and	  No-­‐Fly	  Zones	  
An important aspect of the intervention in Libya is the two resolutions 1970 and 1973 
and the implementation of a no-flight zone over Libya. Therefore this part of the 
analysis will go into depth with the two resolutions and the no-flight zone in order to 
answer the second sub-question asking: Can UN Resolution 1973 gain legitimacy from 
the Responsibility to Protect norm? 
Despite the relative speed with which the Security Council first acted on 26 February, 
when it unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, which imposed sanctions against the 
Libyan regime in the face of a mounting humanitarian crisis, and then followed it up 
with Resolution 1973 only 19 days later, it was clear that no detailed consideration had 
been given as to how the military enforcement of the Security Council’s mandate would 
be carried out. This dilemma highlighted the absence of standing United Nation armed 
forces. This was initially overcome through the willingness of the British, French and 
the US to use forces in the initial implementation and enforcement of the mandated 
Libyan no-fly zone. 
The Security Council has for long authorized peacekeeping missions to use ‘all 
necessary means’ to protect civilians, in contexts including Haiti, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire. But 
Resolution 1973 on the situation in Libya marked the first time the Council had 
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authorized the use of force for human protection purposes against the wishes of a 
functioning state (Popovski: 7). Examples of previously resolutions are: 
In Resolution 794 (1992), the Council authorized the Unified Task Force to enter 
Somalia to ease the humanitarian crisis there, but this was in the absence of a central 
government rather than against one – a point made at the time by several Council 
members. In Resolution 929 (1994), the Security Council authorized the French-led 
Operation Turquoise to protect victims and targets of the genocide then under way in 
Rwanda; this mission had the consent of the interim government in Rwanda as well as 
its armed forces. In passing Resolution 1973, the Council showed that it will not be 
inhibited as a matter of principle from authorizing enforcement for protection purposes 
by the absence of host state consent (Popovski: 7). 
	  
1970	  
According to the R2P norm an essential function of an intervention force should be to 
provide basic security and protection for all members of the state in which intervention 
is transpiring. This also means that intervening military forces are obligated to prevent 
revenge killings, and even reverse ethnic cleansing after the initial objectives of 
interventions are met, use of military force should be an absolute last resort after all 
non-military options has been exhausted. This is exactly what Resolution 1730 seeks to 
do.  
Resolution 1970 demanded an immediate end to the violence happening in Libya. It 
urged Libya to act with utmost restraint, to respect human rights, to ensure safety of all 
foreign nationals, to allow safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and lift 
media restrictions. As Qaddafi showed no intention to do this, the resolution also 
imposed United Nations Charter Chapter 7 sanctions on Libya. These sanctions were an 
arms embargo, strengthened with a call upon states to inspect all cargo, that may, upon 
reasonable ground to believe, contain prohibited items; a travel ban against 16 Libyan 
officials, among them Qaddafi himself, some of his family members and military 
leaders, involved in violence. Furthermore the resolution freezes all assets owned by the 
Libyan state, Qaddafi and a number of prominent pro-Qaddafi individuals. (UN 
Resolution 1970: 2011) (UN Charter: Chapter 7). As a result of this $150 billion in 
sovereign assets once controlled by former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and his 
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inner circle was frozen abroad by foreign governments and 144 tonnes of gold is held 
by the Libyan central bank (Alternet (01-09-2011).  
The resolution also references to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which gives the 
Security Council the power to suspend International Criminal Court investigations if it 
believes doing so would advance peace and security (UN Resolution 1973).  
David Bosco senior assistant professor at American University's School of International 
Service phrases the issue very clearly: 
“It is notable that the resolution references (although in a non-operative paragraph) 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which gives the Council the power to suspend ICC 
investigations if it believes doing so would advance peace and security. It’s not 
immediately obvious to me why a resolution referring a situation to the court would 
emphasize this provision. It’s possible that China, the United States and others 
particularly sceptical of an untethered ICC simply wanted to emphasize the Council’s 
power to reel in the court. But it could also be a signal that the Council would consider 
stopping the ICC process in exchange for the peaceful transfer of power” (Foreign 
Policy 27-02- 2011). 
He is not alone in this line of thought. Mark Kersten, a PhD student in International 
Relations at the London School of Economics, offers a similar explanation at Justice in 
Conflict: 
“During Security Council negotiations, there was significant disagreement about 
whether or not to refer the situation to the ICC at all. The primary source of 
ambivalence by some states, including India, Brazil, Gabon and Portugal, revolved 
around whether peace and justice should be sequenced. India argued for a “calibrated 
approach”. A compromise was reached through a preambular reference in the Security 
Council’s referral to Article 16 of the Rome Statute” (Justice in Conflict: 27-02-2011). 
This is an example of international criminal justice and the peace versus justice debate. 
It would seem that the Security Council, in order to obtain unanimous support for 
referring the Libyan situation to the International Criminal Court, felt compelled to 
mention Article 16 as a possible carrot to negotiate a peaceful transition with Gaddafi. 
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There was no positive reaction from Qaddafi to Resolution 1970, but he in fact 
committed clear breaches of it, refusing to permit humanitarian aid convoys into the 
besieged Misrata and Ajdabiya, a clear failure by Libya to exercise responsibility to 
protect. 
	  
1973	  
Only 19 days after the adoption of Resolution 1970, the international community 
decided that all non-military means of stopping Qaddafi had been exhausted. It can be 
discussed if this was really the case or if more could have been done, and if so if it 
would have been successful. Whether or not this was the case the United Nations 
adopted resolution 1973. The purpose of this resolution was to provide basic security 
and protection for all members of the Libyan state and call for the international 
community to fulfil their R2P.  For intervention forces, the most logical measure to 
prevent ethnic cleansing would be to ensure that local security forces are disarmed and 
demobilized. Therefore resolution 1973 calls upon the previous sanctions regarding 
arms embargo already adopted in resolution 1970 and implemented by members of the 
United Nations. 
 
 
Security Council Resolution 1973 begins with the call for the immediate establishment 
of a ceasefire. It reminds Libya that it is the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to 
protect the Libyan population and those parties to armed conflicts bear the primary 
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians.  
The most notable thing about the resolution is that it authorizes United Nations Member 
States “...to take all necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas” of Libya, herby overriding United Nations Charter Article 2: “All members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. (UN Charter: Chapter 2) This is 
not on its own sensational; the United Nations have in the pasts authorized the use of all 
necessary measures in peacekeeping mission.  However, this have always been in 
cooperation with the, at that time, reigning government. This sanction has never before 
been used against a government, without that governments consent or request.  
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The disregard of UN Charter chapter 2 is due to specific mention of the situation in 
Libya as "a threat to international peace and security. This paves the way for action 
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which authorizes the use of force. The references “to 
the determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and 
the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of 
humanitarian personnel”, affirms that the international community intends to back its 
words with action (UN resolution 1973). 
Because of Libya’s threat to the peace and security of the international community it is 
possible to invoke Un Charter Chapter 7. This chapter addresses threats and breaches of 
peace and acts of aggression. By invoking all necessary means the Security Council 
invokes chapter 7 article 41:  
“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of 
the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” (UN 
Charter: Chapter 7,41) and article 42 “Should the Security Council consider that 
measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be 
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include 
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members 
of the United Nations (UN Charter: Chapter 7,42).” 
The normative purpose of resolution 1973, which focuses on stopping human suffering 
has its legitimate base within the R2P framework. However it is necessary to declare 
Libya a threat to international security and to invoke chapter 7 of the UN Charter to 
make the intervention legal.  
The resolution provides the international community the legal foundation to take all 
necessary measures, in order to assist the population of Libya and to secure 
international security. This leaves a considerable gap for interpretation and suggests that 
the consequences of this military action were not carefully thought through. Here we 
have to bear in mind the need for proportionality set forth by the R2P framework, and to 
consider whether or not this condition was met when intervening in Libya. The facts 
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suggest that this is not the case. President Obama was careful to state on 18th March 
that, "we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal -- specifically, the 
protection of civilians in Libya." Ten days later Obama said, "while our military mission 
is narrowly focused on saving lives, we continue to pursue the broader goal of a Libya 
that belongs not to a dictator, but to its people." It quickly became apparent, as the New 
York Times reported on 28th March, that the US and its European allies had "given it 
the most expansive possible interpretation, amounting to an all-out assault on Libya's 
military" (New York Times 28-03-2011) The intervention resulted in bombing of areas 
with civil present and raising questions as to whether the Coalition should arm the 
rebels, an option US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton said was within her interpretation 
of the resolution (The Guardian 29-03-2011). It was not only China and Russia, but also 
Brazil, Germany and India who abstained for voting in adopting Resolution 1973 
because of the possibility of large-scale loss of civilian lives, the danger of being drawn 
into a long military confrontation, and the worsen of tensions on the ground. Especially 
South Africa, who voted for the resolution expressed their disappointment afterwards. 
This was caused by the repeating bombing of pro-Qaddafi cities and the infliction of 
civil deaths in connection with these bombings. Also the later NATO implementation of 
foot troops, whose goal was to assist rebel troops, caused a number of states to express 
concern about the sanctions approved by Resolution 1973. 
 
No-­‐flight	  zones	  
In response to Qaddafi's assault on the people of Libya, the imposition of a "no-fly 
zone" in Libya was called for by the Gulf Cooperation Council on March 7, 2011, and 
by the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on March 8, 2011. On 12 
March 2011 Arab League foreign ministers voted to ask the United Nations Security 
Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya. The vote, at a special meeting in Cairo, 
was backed by all member states. The Arab League requested the United Nations 
Security Council to impose a no-fly zone after Qaddafi was reported to have used 
warplanes, warships, tanks and artillery to seize back cities taken over in what started 
out a month earlier as mass protests by peaceful civilians seeking an end to his 41-year 
rule (UN Resolution 1973). 
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Expressing concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the 
heavy civilian casualties, the Council established a no-fly zone, banning all flights - 
except those for humanitarian purposes - in Libyan airspace in order to help protect 
civilians (BBC: 19-03-2011). The legal basis for Libyan no-flight zones is found in 
resolution 1973. 
For the no-fly zone it "authorizes member states that have notified the secretary-general 
and the secretary-general of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through 
regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce 
compliance with the ban on flights," and "requests the states concerned in cooperation 
with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the secretary-general on the 
measures they are taking to implement this ban.”  
(BBC: 19-03-2011) 
The League of Arab States support for a no-fly-zone effectively neutralized opposition 
from Russia and China to Security Council Resolution 1973. Moreover, the military 
action by the U.S., France and Britain has gone far beyond a no-fly-zone. Indeed, 
Obama, France’s President Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain’s David Cameron wrote in the 
International Herald Tribune that said the NATO force will fight in Libya until 
President Muammar Qaddafi is gone, even though the Resolution does not sanction 
forcible regime change (Marjorie Cohn 15-05-2012). 
 
Even though a number of states refrained from voting when adopting Resolution 1970 
and   the fact that states expressed concern with the degree of force used, many have 
declared Resolution 1973 a success for the R2P norm. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
noted that:  
“Resolution 1973 affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community’s 
determination to fulfil its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated 
upon them by their own government” (The Star 21-03-2011).  
 
And Ramesh Thakur, a political science professor in Canada and a former R2P 
commissioner at the United Nations, said that: 
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 "Resolution 1973 marks the first military implementation of the doctrine of 
'responsibility to protect'". He concluded that "R2P is coming closer to being solidified 
as an actionable norm"(The Star 21-03-2011). 
 
Thakur believes that Resolution 1973 is truly an example of military implemented R2P, 
and that the case of Libya has ensured the future of the norm. However the 
implementation of Resolution 1973 as a successful example of R2P can be questioned. 
The implementation met a lot of criticism mainly revolving the fact that a lot of 
countries questioned whether or not the Western intervention, in what could be 
described as a civil war, could be said to be sanctioned by the United Nations Security 
Council resolution. Brazil noted that, "the use of force [in Libya] has made a political 
solution more difficult to achieve." Mexico referred to the divisive effect that the Libyan 
crisis was having on the international community, while Kenya said that the experience 
with implementation of R2P so far "has been at best worrisome, and at worst, deeply 
disconcerting" (Online Opinion 26-08-2011). This critique along with the expansion of 
the aims of Resolution 1973 to include regime change may be counterproductive to 
future efforts to invoke the R2P to achieve its stated objective, which is the protection 
of civilian populations, not the removal of dictators. 
 
4.1.4.	  State	  Interests	  –	  China	  and	  Russia	  	  
The Responsibility to Protect covers in its origin not only the Western countries but also 
all member-states of the United Nations. It is however important to keep in mind that it 
is only a norm and not a law, which therefor means that countries cannot be held legally 
accountable for not upholding the Responsibility to Protect. This passage is interested in 
if some countries’ interests implicated on the decision to intervene in Libya and is 
answering the third sub-question, which sounds: How did state interests affect the 
intervention in Libya? The focus will foremost be on China and Russia.  
As mentioned earlier, the intervention in Libya started as an United Nations initiative. 
Both China and Russia are permanent members of the UN Security Council, which 
gives them the right to interpose VETO but neither of them did. Later NATO overtook 
the implementation of the intervention, which meant that even though Russia and China 
were against the use of force in the effort to pursue a regime change they no longer had 
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a say in the decision. A number of sources indicates that both China and Russia had 
some self-interests in abstaining from voting at the UNSC resolution 1973, which leads 
us to ask if state interests affect the decision to support an intervention and if it does, 
what interest might this be? 
One explanation could be that China has a lot of investments in African countries and 
among these also in Libya. It could therefor be argued that China has different interests 
in Libya than some of the pro-intervention countries who are more concerned about the 
protection of the citizens. China had its own responsibility to protect in Libya but it 
merely concerned the Chinese citizens situated there. There have been found evidence 
that Chinese arms companies have made business with some of Qaddafi’s people, 
which would be against the 1970 resolution, which China voted for, and bad for the 
position as a permanent member of the UNSC. The Chinese foreign ministry confirmed 
that Chinese firms were in contact with Qaddafi but denied that the government had any 
knowledge of these claims and stated that there had not been any actual trade-offs, 
which one might find rather contradicting (ECFR 31.10.2011). The quotation below 
from the European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR) elaborates on the damage the 
Chinese companies could cause China’s position on the international stage.  
“The arms deals highlighted how Chinese arms companies have an economic interest 
that can clash with China’s multilateral reputation and with other economic interests 
from Chinese construction companies in quickly picking up where they left in Libya 
before the conflict”.  
(ECFR 31.10.2011) 
Also Russia experienced an economic loss when the Libya intervention occurred. Due 
to resolution 1970 Russia’s export of weapons to Libya fell and the oil-interests were 
endangered. Just like China Russia also has several companies situated in Libya, which 
means that also they had interests in protecting the Russian citizens in Libya but 
probably also the companies and the economic interests connected to these. In fact the 
Russian Energy Minister Sergei Shmatko said that Russia hoped to defend its economic 
interests in Libya (Pravda 24.03.2011).  
But the interests of the two states do not only concern companies situated in Libya. 
Another component, which might actually be the most central argument for Russia and 
China being against the intervention, is the emphasis on state sovereignty. China has a 
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history of having undergone several interventions through time, which has led to the 
opposition against interventions and a strong emphasis on state sovereignty. Enshrined 
in Chinas constitutions is the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, which among 
other things include respect for sovereignty and non-interference in in other states’ 
internal affairs. Even though the principles are from the 1950s they still play a rhetorical 
big role today (Davis 2001:224). In the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, a legal 
journal published by Vanderbilt University in Tennessee with writings about current 
and emerging issues of comparative and international law, the attorney Jonathan E. 
Davis has written about Chinas position on humanitarian interventions. Davis sees 
China as an important actor in international law and humanitarian interventions and thus 
Chinas role shall not be ignored. China is often characterised as a persistent objector to 
interventions but at the same time some parts of the R2P norm have been adopted. The 
implementation of R2P has for instance meant that China has had to position them self 
in accordance to the norm, which now means that they do support interventions if it is 
executed with United Nations Security Council authorisation and with consent from the 
country in which the intervention takes place. But as China is one of the Permanent Five 
members of the Security Council veto is an option to prevent interventions and maintain 
the state sovereignty (Davis 2011: 257). 
When NATO in 1999 decided to intervene in Kosovo by using force and to support the 
separatists with military supplies a fear in China and Russia emerged. The Diplomat, an 
international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region, has in relation to 
China and Russia’s role in the Libya intervention written, that the fear of an military 
intervention posed by the United States to defend Taiwan and Georgia against attempts 
of forceful reunifications could very well have reoccurred in 2011 (The Diplomat 
05.04.2011). This can help explaining why the two states were against the Libyan 
intervention – they feared that it might also happen to them.  
Instead of using humanitarian interventions as the mean to stop civilian suffering China 
has emphasised humanitarian assistance, meaning that instead of using force to stop the 
sufferings and thereby overrule state sovereignty, the help should in stead be done with 
respect for sovereignty and with the consent of all parties and the use of force shall only 
be accepted in situations of self-defence during peacekeeping operations. China has also 
stressed the importance of interventions being on a case-to-case basis, which can be 
connected to their fear of intervention (Davis 2011: 257-260).  
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The above shows that both China and Russia had some clear interests regarding the 
Libya intervention, which might have influenced the decision to abstain from voting in 
the UNSC and the objections against the later following NATO intervention. If we 
consider the two states in relation to neo-realism and constructivism the importance of 
state-interests becomes even clearer. Neo-realists argue that states act out of self-
interests and only to obtain some sort of a relative gain. If Russia and China should 
have been in favour of an intervention, with respect to the company-argument above, it 
would be with the goal to increase their market-share in Libya and through that gain an 
economic advantage. It would not just be to help the civilian Libyans. When making an 
effort to protect the companies situated in Libya the relative gain is to be taken into 
account. Neo-realists are concerned with the value of relative gain, which means that 
the gain itself is not important, what matters is what one state gains compared to 
another. If this is to be applied to the behaviour of China and Russia it could explain 
why they abstained from voting. Even though one state is in trouble other states cannot 
afford to let everything else go to help them – China and Russia still have to consider 
their own possible gains. 
Considering the second argument posed above, the neo-realistic explanation of why 
China and Russia abstained from voting would be that it was due to the fear putting 
them selves in a position that could lead to an intervention in China or Russia. China 
did as mentioned stress the importance of interventions being on a case-to-case basis, 
which could be to prevent a scenario where interventions in executed on the grounds of 
some criterions and without any consideration to the difference of the states. When 
abstaining from voting on the UNSC both China and Russia did what they could, 
without interposing veto, to prevent an intervention, which pursued a regime change. 
Neo-realist would however argue that when a state has the opportunity to interpose veto 
and thereby protect its self-interests, it would do it, but neither China nor Russia did.  
Constructivists on the other hand stress the importance of interests and identities, which 
can also help explaining why China and Russia were against an intervention. 
Constructivists argue that identities are the basis of interests, which means that the 
interests of a state are reflected in its actions. When China and Russia abstained from 
voting the action can be seen as a reflection of their interests. Chinas’ emphasis on state 
sovereignty and their suggestion to use humanitarian assistance rather than 
humanitarian interventions could be a sign of humanitarian interests; a sign that China 
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simply does not wish to support the use of force.  Roughly it can be said that those 
states in favour of an intervention voted yes to the resolutions and that this action shows 
that they have an interest in intervening and that those who abstained from voting is not 
interested in helping. It is here important to note that the interest of states not 
necessarily is self-interests but that it might as well be interests regarding other 
countries. It the case of Libya the interests of the intervening states could just as well be 
an interest in helping the civilians as it could be a self-interest of the state.  
It seems evident that state-interest play a role when it has to be decided whether to 
intervene or not. Both Chinese and Russian have some interests in protecting the 
companies and the employees situated in and their abstention from voting on Resolution 
1973 can be seen as a way of going against the plan of pursuing a regime change, which 
could have bad impact on the companies and through there also on China and Russia. 
Another and probably more valid explanation for the Chinese and Russian abstention is 
their fear of being intervened. China has a history of being intervened in, which has led 
to the opposition against interventions. Neo-realists would argue that China and Russia 
are only concerned with their self-interests and that it is the reason for abstaining from 
voting on Resolution 1973. Constructivists on the other hand would probably put 
emphasis on the two states wishes to obtain ceasefire and promote humanitarian 
assistance rather than humanitarian interventions.  
  
China,	  Russia	  and	  the	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  
It is worth mentioning that is was not only China and Russia who abstained from voting 
on resolution 1973. Also India, Brazil and Germany did so. R2P is as mentioned earlier 
not a law but only a norm and not all members of the United Nations acknowledges this 
norm. It is however only a small handful of states who reject the agreement of R2P. 
Belarus has called R2P no more than a trendy concept and said that one such do not 
justify an intervention in a sovereign state. Russia has called the R2P irrelevant and 
stated that there is no international consensus on a responsibility to protect. Russia has 
however used R2P to justify its involvement in Georgia in 2008 even though this 
particular case did not fulfil the conditions posed by R2P. The example of Russia using 
R2P for its own good and Belarus calling it a trendy concept, shows that not all states 
takes it equally seriously. This will however not be discussed further (Diplomaatia 
2012).   
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Neo-realists view membership in international organisations as a way of achieving 
security, balance power between states, and thereby to uphold their self-interests. When 
a state becomes member of an organisation it is thus primarily with a focus on the 
relative gain it can achieve through there. The membership provides security to the 
single state and even though it sometimes will require that one state help another, the 
help is provided to the helping state, who on a longer term will benefit from is as well. 
But membership of an international organisation can also have something else to it than 
just self-interests and relative gains. Constructivism argues that alliances can create 
benign and friendly relationships between states, which can then result in absence of 
war and arms races, thereby strengthening global security.     
Based on the previous passage it seems fair to conclude that China and Russia are 
predominantly neo-realists. Both China and Russia are as mentioned above permanent 
members of the UNSC and furthermore they are parts of the BRICS countries together 
with Brazil, India and South Africa, which shows that they do take part in international 
organisations but they do not necessarily share all the same values within the 
organisations. Within the UNSC and BRICS there are different opinions on whether to 
intervene or not (Foreign Policy Journal 12.10.2011). The only member of BRICS who 
did not abstain from voting on Resolution 1973 was South Africa. Scepticism against 
the R2P is starting to evolve and it is particularly evident within the BRICS. Instead of 
interventions China and Russia are more in favour of political solutions where the use 
of force is not necessary (Forbes 17.06.2011).  
When NATO later overtook the intervention, to pursue a regime change with the needed 
United Nations mandate, Russian officials accused the alliance of “overstepping its 
authority” (Foreign Policy Journal 12.10.2011). China stressed that it was in favour of 
an attempt to maintain Libyan sovereignty and Russia made an effort to be the mediator. 
In fact Russian officials managed to have Qaddafi agreeing on a ceasefire. It only lasted 
72 hours though (Foreign Policy Journal 12.10.2011). 
Nicholas Wheeler poses six criteria, which have to be met before an intervention can be 
characterised as legitimate. These criterions are linked to the R2P. Some of these are 
met but, when being against an intervention as Russia and China, it could be argued that 
the third criterion, stating that military interventions should only be used as a last resort, 
is not met. On the other hand it could be argued that this was met hence Qaddafi agreed 
	   	   December	  18th	  2012	  
	   52	  
to a ceasefire and then broke it 72 hours later, which made an intervention the last 
resort.  
NATO does not meet the critique posed by China and Russia. The Secretary General 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen argues that the NATO intervention was perfectly in line with 
the United Nations mandate that stressed and authorised the members to take “all 
necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack” (The Guardian 15.04.2011).  
 
The Responsibility to Protect was meant to be a norm that gathers the United Nations 
around an agreement to help the citizens of a state, when the government of the given 
state is not itself able to do so. But the conflict in Libya has showed that not all states 
share the belief that interventions are the right mean to stop genocide and large-scale 
national conflicts. Four out of five of the BRICS countries and two out of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC abstained from voting on resolution 1973 in the UN 
Security Council and even though it does not sound like a lot of states, when looking at 
the total, some of those who abstained are big and important states. China and Russia 
emphasised political resolutions and attempts of a ceasefire instead of interventions and 
direct use of force and it has showed a rather clear division between these two countries 
and the West. But at the same time there also seems to be evidence that both China and 
Russia had some interests in abstaining from voting and that it was not only because 
they were against the use of force. Both China and Russia can be in risk of interventions 
executed by NATO and they therefor have an interest in avoiding the use of 
interventions and instead promote more benign solutions such as a ceasefire. 
 
4.1.5.	  Responsibility	  to	  Protect	  After	  Libya	  	  
The previous passage stated that a division between the members of the UNSC became 
clearer when it had to be decided whether to intervene in Libya or not. The 
Responsibility to Protect puts up some guidelines, which should make the decision 
easier and more legitimate but as noted it is not all states that believe in a worldwide 
consensus on R2P. This passage seeks to analyse and discuss if and how the R2P norm 
has been changed after the intervention in Libya. This will be done by answering the 
fourth sub-question, which asks, “which influence has the intervention in Libya had on 
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the norm of Responsibility to Protect?” In the end of this part of the analysis some more 
critical perspectives towards the intervention in Libya will be included.  
The BRICS countries argue that humanitarian interventions have become an 
inappropriate violation of state sovereignty and that humanitarianism should not 
overrule the sovereignty of a state. BRICS countries and in broad terms most of The 
South could, as also mentioned in the previous passage, be characterised as being 
predominantly neo-realist. China and Russia is known to be against violations of state 
sovereignty through interventions but the opposition within the UNSC is quite new. 
Signs of ideological clashes are becoming clearer since more developing countries are 
turning against the R2P norm, which became clear in the case of Syria, where both 
China and Russia interposed veto and the rest of the BRICS countries abstained from 
voting. The opposition and negativity regarding R2P may be the end of it (Foreign 
Policy Journal 12.10.2011). The permanent five’s say in when and where to intervene 
will reflect their interests. According to Aidan Hehir, senior Lecturer in International 
Relations and Director of the Security and International Relations Programme at the 
University of Westminster, state interests “determine their position on a particular issue 
much more so than their commitment to legal or moral principles”, which indicates that 
states only vote in favour of a resolution and intervention if it suites the interests of the 
given state. He also stresses that the problem with the R2P is that it is authorized by the 
UNSC and thereby the permanent five alone can decide whether to intervene or not. 
Hehir’s general assumption is that the R2P is a norm mainly supported by the Western 
states and that it in fact is not much more than a slogan. That two out of five permanent 
members of the UNSC is against R2P and intervention, and hence abstained from 
voting on Resolution 1973 on Libya and interposed veto on an intervention in Syria, 
which was supported by the rest of the BRICS countries and several development 
countries, shows that the resistance might be growing (Hehir 2011).   
Many see the intervention in Libya as a validation of the R2P, which is due to the fact 
that it was conducted on the grounds stated in the R2P. For those the intervention was 
based on a broad global consensus with the goal to stop the killings of civilian Libyans 
and authorizing the use of force on humanitarian grounds. Critics of the R2P on the 
other hand characterize Libya as an example of selective national concern meaning that 
states interfere selectively and not all the time (Current Intelligence 27-09-2011). The 
R2P is stating that interventions are case-to-case situations and hence it does not mean 
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that there will be an intervention each time a country is in trouble, even though it might 
fulfil some of the creations posed by the R2P – as the case was in Syria (Bellamy 2011). 
One could fear that the selective behaviour could end up being the end of R2P because 
of the lack of consistency, which might turn more countries into critics and thereby 
make them abstain from voting on different resolutions and intervention-initiatives. At 
the same time it could be argued that the R2P, even though it officially only has been 
there since the 2005 World Summit, is imbedded in many countries, maybe mostly the 
Western, and in the changing norms and expectations on state behaviour, which might 
mean that it is here to stay (Current Intelligence 27-09-2011).   
Thomas G. Weiss, presidential professor of political science at The CUNY Graduate 
Centre and Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, argues that 
R2P has redefined the way state sovereignty is conceived. Sovereignty has gone from 
being absolute to contingent meaning that it used to be constant and paramount. Now 
after the R2P sovereignty is more conditioned and, when it is valuated acceptable, states 
can intervene in another without truly overstepping the sovereignty. Critics have called 
the R2P the new Trojan Horse of the Western world, meaning that it gives the western 
world easier access and more opportunities when interventions are found necessary. 
Weiss on the other hand call the R2P an alibi for using military force to protect humans 
and not a way of overstepping state sovereignty. Libya is the first case where the R2P 
was used to legitimize the use of force for a humanitarian cause and thereby the R2P 
went from being counterproductive to effective due to Resolution 1973 that made it 
possible to stop Qaddafi (Weiss 2011).  
If R2P is going to survive as a part of the normative behaviour there has to be signs of 
efficiency. R2P is not only about doing something when a humanitarian crisis is already 
accruing. It is about preventing, responding and rebuilding. In Libya the two, mainly the 
second, responsibilities were fulfilled and time will show whether the rebuilding part, 
which also becomes a prevention part, will be successful. If the regime change, carried 
out by NATO, is a success it will also be a success for R2P  but if the new regime fails 
R2P also fails since it was used as an argument to intervene and pursue regime change 
(Shanahan 2011). 
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1.4.5.1.	  A	  critical	  perspective	  	  
Both R2P and the intervention in Libya have met opposition. An American 
Conservative MP, Rory Stewart, wrote on the day Resolution 1973 was agreed upon 
about his opinion on the use of interventions. Stewart was in favour of the no-fly zone 
but feared that it was just the beginning and if the band was not used correctly the use of 
force would be the next step. According to Stewart there can be found some similarities 
between the different interventions there have been through time (Stewart 31-03-2011).   
When a situation where an intervention can be the solution occurs it often seems to be a 
question of doing it or not doing it. There is no middle way. Libya was not a country in 
trouble because of genocide or ethnic cleansing, as the case were in Kosovo, Rwanda 
and many others, which makes Stewart argue that Libya did not meet the criterions 
needed for an intervention (Stewart 31-03-2011). Huge Roberts, a director of the 
International Crisis Group’s North Africa Project, is also critical towards the Libya 
intervention. According to him, the Libya intervention was just one in a row in the 
Western war against hostile, defiant states, which, just as Stewart, implies that the 
criterions for an intervention might not have been fulfilled (Roberts 17-11-2011).  
When states decide to intervene in others there can, as mentioned, be found some 
similarities between different cases. Stewart identifies three arguments against action, 
four fears of inaction and a background of guilt, law and moral. The arguments against 
action is that it can be dangerous, both for those taking the action and those on which 
the action is taken; there is a risk that the action achieves nothing, and in that case it is 
then just a waste of resources; or that the action can achieve the opposite of the 
intention making the situation much worse. If this line of thought were followed, the 
most reasonable thing to do would be not to intervene. But then there are the four fears 
of inaction: fear of a rogue state, fear of a failed state, fear for the neighbours and fear 
for ourselves. The fear of a rough state can call for action due to the possible threat of 
weapons of mass destruction, as the case was with the intervention in Iraq. Failed states 
can create a fear of drug dealers and terrorists, which also calls for actions. The fear for 
the neighbours is based on a fear that if one state falls the neighbour state will also fall, 
here Stewart uses Afghanistan and Pakistan as an example saying that an intervention in 
Pakistan was needed just as much as one in Afghanistan. The last fear is the fear for 
ourselves, which is to be understood as a concern for the reputation. States do not wish 
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to be seen as defeated by the enemies. When using these fears as arguments for 
intervening in Libya one could argue that the intervention was based on a fear of what 
would happen after Qaddafi and hence a fear of Al-Qaida as the new regime, secondly it 
could be based on a fear of instability, not only in Libya but in the Northern Africa, 
which could push a lot of refugees towards Europe. The third fear would be the fears of 
the credibility of the West if they just led Qaddafi continue (Stewart 31-03-2011).  
To all of these arguments for or against actions it is important to note that Stewart is 
critical towards interventions and the use of force, which makes the arguments and 
especially the fears rather caricatured. What seem to be alike in the four fears is that 
they all contain an element of self-interests and that these then are used as an excuse to 
intervene and to ‘help’ the given state. The arguments against action can be said to be 
mostly constructivist because of the emphasis on what might happen in the intervened 
state and therefore on the possible consequences and bad outcomes instead of an 
emphasis on the consequences regarding the intervening states. Constructivism argues 
that the actions of a state reflects its interests and identity and whether the stats choses 
to act on the grounds of the arguments against action or the fears of inaction shows if it 
acts out of self-interests or out of an interests to help. Stewart argues that states mainly 
act out of self-interests, which also makes him doubt whether the intervention in Libya 
was in fact legitimate.  
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5.	  Conclusion	  	  
 
Libya is the first case where R2P has been applied against a government failing to 
protect their own citizens. For the first time in history, the Security Council authorized 
member states to take all necessary measures, except for occupying forces, with the 
primary objective of protecting civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of 
attack in Libya. To answer the research question “Which influence has the 
Responsibility to Protect on the intervention in Libya?” the project has focused on the 
legitimacy and the resolution behind the intervention in Libya and the influence R2P 
had on this process. Further it looked into the resistance posed by parts of the 
international community and especially by China and Russia, and what this resistance 
and the implementation of Resolution 1973 has done to the R2P norm.  
The UN Charter does not permit the use of military force for humanitarian 
interventions. The military invasion of Libya has been justified by reference to the three 
pillars of the R2P doctrine. An important part of the legitimacy of this intervention lies 
within the strong presents of regional support, hereby fulfilling the two first R2P pillars 
that highlight that all states must work together to stop human rights violations. Before 
the Security Council issued resolution 1973 on Libya the League of Arab States, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Gulf Cooperation Council had all issued 
statements calling for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya. Without the request 
for action by these organizations and the protests of the Libyan people the intervention 
would have become a question of neo-imperial interference. This would make the 
intervention illegitimate and would have further risked any future interventions set forth 
by the United Nations to halt human suffering. Therefore would an intervention without 
regional support, but which fulfill all R2P criterions, still not be considered legitimate.  
It can be discussed whether or not the intervention in Libya meets all essential R2P 
criterions. In the case of a just cause it can be argued that in light of Qaddafi and the 
pro-Qaddafi troop’s actions, especially Qaddafi’s speech 22th February, it seems 
reasonable to presume that some sort of external international intervention was the only 
effective way to prevent large scale loss of life.  
The most discussed aspect of the R2P criterion is the fact that an international 
intervention must have a right intention. It seems evident that a concern for human life, 
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especially civil lives played a big role in the decision on whether or not to intervene in 
Libya. The goal to spare the lives of civilians seems to be valid. From February 15 to 
April 12 2011 the total number of casualties is reported to be 10.000. This, along with 
Qaddafi’s threat to “cleanse Libya house by house”, suggests that without interference 
this number would have been much higher. It is this concern that causes the intervention 
to gain legitimacy in the R2P doctrine, and it is the first time a United Nations 
intervention has been launched to prevent this kind of suffering before the thousands 
were already dead. Even though the concern to stop human suffering was strong, it 
could be argued that other motives for intervening in Libya was present. It could be 
argued that the political goal of the Libya intervention was in fact a regime change 
rather than a humanitarian concern, thereby putting the international society’s interests 
in Libya before human rights. This applies to both the Arab League and Libya’s 
neighbouring countries, who Qaddafi had alienated over a long period of time, and to 
the West who had an interest in a regime change and in democratizing Libya to promote 
international security. In itself regime change does not meet the R2P criteria of the right 
intention unless the just cause cannot be achieved otherwise. We must conclude that 
even though a regime change were undoubtedly an interest shared by most of the 
international community, maybe with the exception of the BRICS countries, the concern 
for human lives must have been greater. And that an intervention for humanitarian 
purposes with a minor interest in regime change, is better than no intervention at all.      
Whether or not the intervention can be seen as an absolute last resort by the 
international community to prevent human suffering is questionable. Even though it is 
likely that an intervention would eventually have been the outcome no matter what, one 
could argue that a higher degree of non-military attempts to solve the conflict could 
have been implemented. Before the sanctions of Resolution 1970, which include arms 
embargo and a travel ban on Gaddafi and members of his family, and frozen the assets 
held by Libya’s sovereign wealth fund and central bank and the United Nations 
Resolution 1973 approved “All necessary measures”, there should first have been 
peaceful measures to settle the conflict. Yet it seems that peaceful means were not 
exhausted before the military invasion began. An international team – consisting of 
representatives from the Arab League, the African Union, and the United Nations 
Secretary General – should have been dispatched to Tripoli to attempt to negotiate a real 
cease-fire, and set up a mechanism for elections and for protecting civilians. If this had 
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been done the following implementation of Resolution 1973 would have held a higher 
degree of legitimacy, and the discussion of whether or not the right degree of 
proportionality was used would be minimized. It is hard to provide conclusive answers 
to the right degree of proportionality and to if enough was done via diplomacy. It is a 
balance between trying to avoid the use of military force and trying to prevent human 
sufferings. If too much time is spent trying to reason and negotiate cease-fires, it may be 
too late to save human lives. In the case of Libya this balance tipped towards military 
force when Qaddafi announced that he would "fight until the last man” and “show no 
mercy” in a television speech. For the international community this was too similar to 
the rhetoric used in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, and brought an end to negotiating.  
When balancing the use of force or as the R2P framework calls it proportionality there 
are two important things to take into consideration. The first is the potential damage an 
intervention causes a country. The intervening forces risk to unintentionally kill or hurt 
innocent civilians or to leave the county so damaged that the third pillar of R2P, the 
rebuilding and economic future of the country would be endangered. It is not in 
anyone’s interest to leave behind a broken country, and this will undoubtedly harm the 
people more than protect them. The other thing to take into consideration when 
determining the use of force is the balance of international power. If too much force is 
used this will cause concern among members of the United Nations. The reasons for 
this will be discussed below. 
Resolution 1973 was the first resolution ever that authorized the use of “All necessary 
measures” against a functioning government, without this governments request or 
support. Before this it has only been invoked in the absence of a government or when a 
government has lost control and realized that it will not be able to protect its citizens. 
This is where the R2P norm shows its influence on the intervention in Libya. Without 
the R2P guidelines it is not certain that the resolution would ever have been adopted. 
Unfortunately this may also be the last time this happens. It is in itself remarkable that 
neither China nor Russia did not veto the resolution to begin with, but the way the 
resolution was implemented and the massive use of force has caused great concern 
within the international community. This concern arises from the fact that a resolution, 
whose original intention was to protect lives, quickly became a resolution which 
intention clearly was a regime change. Especially Russia, China and Brazil has 
distanced themselves from this and proclaimed that what started as a just cause and a 
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good resolution became something they cannot condone, and that they, in the future, 
will veto this kind of resolutions. It seems safe to conclude that this shift of norm 
toward R2P as a means of legitimizing regime change does not sit well with especially 
Russia and China. The reason for this is simple. If the United Nations has the power to 
force regime change, based on human rights concerns and the R2P norm, Russia and 
China are themselves targets.  
Even though there was regional support for an international intervention in Libya and it 
can be argued that the criterions posed by the R2P protocol were fulfilled it is not all 
states that would agree on this. When Resolution 1973 was up for vote both Russia and 
China abstained from voting which showed their opposition clearly. One could wonder 
why neither of them used their ability to interpose veto, but this has not been the 
concern of the project. What has been the focus is the influence state-interests can have 
on international decisions. Were self-interests the reason that China and Russia 
abstained from voting on Resolution 1973?  
Neo-realism argues that states act out of self-interests and that they are always 
concerned with relative gains. A state is only interested in helping others if it implies 
some sort of gain for the helping state. There is no such thing as benign relationships 
between states. Both China and Russia have companies situated in Libya, which can 
explain why they did not support Resolution 1973 and the following NATO 
intervention. It is possible that the two states wanted to protect the companies and the 
economic interests connected to these, which can also imply that they are more 
concerned with their own gains. There were found evidence that Chinese companies had 
made business with some of Qaddafi’s people, which was both confirmed and at the 
same time denied by the Chinese government. Resolution 1970, which among other 
things imposed an arms embargo, also affected Russian companies and there are 
therefore reason to believe that the companies situated in Libya might have affected 
China and Russia’s decision to abstain from voting. The Russian Energy Minister 
Sergei Shmatko said in a statement, that Russia hoped to defend its economic interests 
in Libya.  
There is, however, also another possible explanation to the abstention from voting on 
Resolution 1973. China and Russia are both countries that might fear that they can be 
the ‘victims’ of an intervention in case interventions evolve from being conducted on a 
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case-to-case basis to being done on the basis of some specific guidelines. China has 
through history been intervened several times, which has caused and opposition towards 
interventions and an emphasis on state sovereignty. Instead of humanitarian 
interventions China is more in favour of humanitarian assistance, which among other 
things indicates non-use of force and provision of aid-supplies. Russia was in favour of 
trying to obtain a ceasefire, which they actually managed but which also broke down 
after only 72 hours. China does to some extend acknowledge interventions but it is only 
valuated legitimate if they are conducted with the consent of the state being intervened. 
Neo-realism believes that great powers constantly must balance their power in order to 
reduce the risk of another country turning on them. A way of upholding this balance 
between great powers is by military build-ups and engaging in alliances. This neo-
realistic point of view can provide an argument for why China and Russia were hesitant 
when it came it Resolution 1973. It is possible that the abstained from voting instead of 
interposing veto in order to maintain the relationship to the other members of the UNSC 
and at the same time they were able to uphold the relationship to the other states who 
were not in favour of an intervention.  
China and Russia’s abstention from voting on Resolution 1973 and the later veto 
against an intervention in Syria shows that an opposition towards the R2P has started to 
evolve. With regard to Resolution 1973 South Africa was the only member of the 
BRICS that voted yes to the resolution, which they later expressed regrets about. Russia 
has among other countries declared that they do not consider R2P a universal norm and 
it has been called no more than a trendy concept, which clearly shows that R2P is 
meeting resistance. The resistance towards the intervention in Libya and R2P shows a 
clash of ideologies. Critics of R2P have stressed that it is problematic that interventions 
are conducted on a case-to-case basis and hence on the basis of selective national 
concern, meaning that states interfere selectively and not all the time. An example of 
this selectivity is the cases of Libya and Syria. Other critics have questioned whether an 
intervention in Libya in the first place was needed and legitimate since it was not a case 
of genocide or ethnic cleansing, which has made them call the intervention no more 
than one in a row in the Western war against hostile and defiant states. Those in favour 
of R2P on the other hand see the norm as a way of conducting interventions based on a 
global consensus of stopping civilian killings and to them Libya were a validation of 
R2P since it was conducted with its foundation in the R2P framework. Some believes 
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that time will show whether or not the intervention in Libya was a success, which also 
will determine whether or not R2P will be used as a legitimate framework for 
conducting interventions.  
 
 
Resolution 1973 marks the first military implementation of the doctrine of R2P. Had the 
international community shirked this responsibility, Libya could have become R2P’s 
graveyard. In the old world order, international politics, like all politics, was a struggle 
for power. The new international politics will be about the struggle of competing 
normative architectures based on a combination of power, values and ideas. Ramesh 
Thakur, a political science professor in Canada and a former "R2P commissioner" at the 
United Nations, concluded that "R2P is coming closer to being solidified as an 
actionable norm". According to Thakur this will in the future allow intervention into 
states in the name of humanitarian concerns. But the issue still remains highly debated, 
and one of the main concerns is that a codification of the "right" of intervention would 
provide a mandate for strong states to appeal to humanitarian concerns in order to 
exercise "imperialist" ambitions in weaker states. It is not likely that R2P once again 
will be used as the legitimate framework of an intervention due to massive resistance 
from China, Russia and several other development countries. More importantly, 
however, it is vital to stress that there is not necessarily a legal norm that actually 
obliges the UN Security Council to apply the R2P ana it will probably never become a 
legal norm. In fact, the R2P does not alter the legal obligation of Member States to 
refrain from the use of force except in conformity with the Charter. 
The intervention Libya was made possible and most of all legitimate because of the R2P 
norm. Libya was not a typical case where the intervention first occurred after a massive 
loss of life and it was the first time that an intervention was conducted without the 
consent of the intervened state.   
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6.	  Perspective	  
This project has only focused on the intervention in Libya and only few parallels have 
been drawn to earlier interventions. For a further study of the Responsibility to Protect 
the case of Syria could be relevant. Libya was part of the Arab Spring and so was Syria. 
As it has been stated through this project, interventions is not a simple action; when it 
became clear to the UNSC that an intervention in Syria might be needed, in order to 
stop the evolving conflict, UNSC met more resistance than during the Libya case. When 
resolution 1973 was up for votation Russia, China, Brazil and India abstained from 
voting but neither Russia nor China used their ability to interpose veto. Russia’s 
President Medvedev said on 21th of June that Russia would veto a Security Council 
resolution on Syria similar to SC Resolution 1973, "because it is my deep conviction 
that a good resolution has been used to provide cover for a military operation" (Online 
Opinion 26-08-2012). This became evident in Syria where both China and Russia used 
their veto-votes. The opposition that started to show in Libya became clearer and also 
South Africa, who voted for Resolution 1973, abstained from voting on Syria because 
of NATO’s use of force and military power to pursue a regime change backed up by a 
UNSC mandate.  
The revolt in Syria rose due to years of oppression led by President Bashar Assad and 
so fare more than thousands of lives have been lost. It is estimated that more than 
200.000 from the opposition are imprisoned and civilians as well as rebels are being 
oppressed, imprisoned and killed. But due to the veto’s of China and Russia an UNSC 
led intervention is not possible and neither is a NATO intervention since it needs a 
UNSC mandate to be legitimate (Information2012).  
Among the Western countries the attitude was that an intervention was needed in order 
to stop the killings and President Assad. Where as two out of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council had vetoed an intervention in Syria the remaining 
three were very much in favour of one. France, Britain and the USA formed together 
with EU and The Arab League a coalition named Friends of Syria. The aim of this 
coalition is to provide help to the opposition and function as the legitimate 
representative of the Syrian people (The Telegraph2012).  
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It seems that a rather clear division between the Permanent Five is evolving and 
spreading to other parts of the United Nations. In the Syria case the coalition of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) all proved to be against an intervention 
where as most of the West is pro-intervention. As it has been proven through the 
analysis of the project, the concept of Responsibility to Protect has been through a lot of 
resistance and it is far from all states that acknowledge it as a valid background for 
interventions. For a further study on R2P and its influence, Syria would be an 
interesting case to compare to Libya in order to analyse the changed conception of R2P 
as a universal norm. In this relation a relevant question could be, whether R2P has 
created a bigger gap between the member states in the UN instead of bringing them 
closer around some common guidelines on how and when to interfere with the 
sovereignty of other states.  
Another aspect that could be further studied is why states as China and Russia are so 
opposed to interventions. In the project this question has slightly been touched upon but 
there has not been a more thoroughly analysis regarding it. On this subject the analysis 
argues that a possible reason for China and Russia to be against interventions and 
instead promote ceasefire and non-use of force is based on a fear that they might 
themselves be exposed to an intervention if it evolves from being something done on a 
case-to-case basis to something done in all countries not fulfilling certain criterions. 
Further a study regarding this aspect of interventions and R2P could be concerned with 
the way the international society is conducting the interventions and that there might be 
a change in the way international legal practice is conducted.  
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